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Abstract of
The Law of the Sea: International Law ImplLcations
of the U.S. Refusal to Sign the Treaty
This study is undertaken to show the impact of the
internat~onal law aspects of the Law of the Sea Treaty as
they relate to the V.S. failure to sign the Treaty.
The U.S. has embarked on a course of action, by its
refusal to sign the Treaty, that can have major impact on
day=to~day national policy issues as they relate to
internationul law governing a state's behavior. This
behavior specially relates to the right of unhindered
passage of ships and aircraft through straits, and the
future of the U.S. deep seabed mining as a unilateral
undertaking.
In considering the impact of the Treaty on the U.S. we
note three types of provisions contained in the document;
those that simply codify existing customary practice; those
not reflecting customary international law as yet; and
those that require specific adherence by those wishing to
take advantage of them and who have formally agreed to the
arrangements.
The U.S~, in refusing to sign the Treaty because of
the deep seabed provisions, and yet claiming other
ii
provisions as reflecting customary law, is probably correct
as viewed in boday's realities.
The U.S. is acting in its own best interests ~n
refusing to sign based totally on ~he deep seabed
provisions of the Treaty.
iii
PREFACE
Several sources quoted in this paper are indicated as
unpublished material and were provided to me by Professor
Jon Jacobsen who occupies the Stockton Chair of
International Law at the u.s. Naval War College. These
sourceS are papers delive~ed by the indicated person, at
val:ious mee-ei~ngs or pro.fessional cohferences which have
relevance to the subject of this paper.
Pro£essor Jacobsen also assisted me early in my
interest in this topic, by providing a general outline for
consideration in developing my ideas on how to approach
this difficult subject.
All of the "How To" manuals for writers say you
ordinarily do not acknowledge the research advisor, I,
however, discard this advice. I wish to thahk Professor
Juda for the sound advice provided on managing the scope of
my project and the encouragement he gave on undertaking
t.his task.
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CHAPTER I
The U.s. Rejection of the Law of the Sea Treaty:
The Current status of the U.S. Rejection of the Treaty.
Fifteen years after Ambassador Arvid Pardo's UN General
Assembly speech initiated the "Third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of ~he Sea, the completed Convention was
opened for signature on December 6-10, 1982, at Montego
Bay, Jamaica. At a September meeting of the same year, the
Conference in New York City cleured the way for this signing.
There is little doubt that the Convention, which was
adopted on April 30, 1982, by u vote of 130 in favor to 4
against--which included the United States--with 17 absten-
°tions, will enter into force sometime wi thin the next
decade; only 60 state ratifications are required to achieve
this. Two states, the soviet Union and France, both pioneer
deep sea mining states, have committed themselves to the
Treaty.
President Reagan announced on July 9, 1982, that the
U.S. would withhold signature of the Convention, as it was
adopted, due to certain reservations concerning the deep
sea mining text. He did, however, declare that, "Those
extensive parts dealing with navigation and overflight and
most other provisions of the Convention arB consistent with
United States interests and, in our view, serve well the
interests of all nations."l
1
It could be possible for the U.S. objections to the
provisions on deep sea mining to be met ~hrough actual
improvements in the textual language at the meetings sched-
uled to take place beginning in March 1983 when the Prepa-
ratory Commission meets. The U.S. is allowed to attend
these meetings as an observer but without a vote. President
Reagan has decided, however, no~ ~o send an observer. This
means that the opportunity to influence the regulations
adopted by the Prep-Com will be lost, and the United States
will be outside, not only the rn~ning issues but on all the
other aspects of ocean law covered by the comprehensive
treaty.
Since President Reagan's pronouncements regarding the
Treaty, several initiatives to pursue U.S. ocean interests
outside the treaty framework have come from various members
of Congress. On September 30, 1982, Congressmen Beaux and
Forsythe introduced legislation proposing a 20Q-mile Exclu-
sive Economic Zone (EEZ) off the United States. Senator
Stevens has introduced a similar measure in the Senate. In
addition, there had been widespread rumors that the Presi-
dent may issue a Proclamation claiming an EEZ in eDrly
1983. 2
On March 10, 1983, President Reagan laid c~aim to a
200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone off the shores of
all U.S. territory and possessions.
The proclamation stakes out U.S. rights to explore and
mine all minerals in the zone, including oil and gas. The
proclamation took effect immediately. The chief impact
will be to protect U.S. rights to the mining of minerals. 3
While the measure maintains that U.S. rights will be
asserted consistently with internationally recognized free-
doms of the high seas, there is no clear stipulation as to
what these are in the view of the United States and whose
determination of these freedoms will be binding on the
Onited States.
Just how has the United States arrived at this diffi-
cult point in relation to the Law of the Sea Treaty?
The following chapters will develop a brief history of
the trends in the law of the sea; outline the role that the
U.S. played in getting the Law of the Sea Treaty where it
is today; describe the U.S. interests in the Treaty, and
discuss U.S. nonparticipation realities from an interna-
tional law point of view.
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CHAPTER II
Brief History of how the u.s. Arrived at
Present Impasse with the Law of the Sea Treaty.
Pre-1945: The historic function of the law of the sea
has long been recognized as that of protecting and balancing
the common interests of all people in the use and enjoyment
of the ocean, and rejecting all claims of special interests
that would circumvent the general interest of states. l
The concept of freed~m of the sea evolved as a reaction
against the broad claims to territorial sovereignty over
vast sea areas put forward by Spain, Portugal, England and
other states in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
The object of these claims was to monopolize fisheries, and
trade with areas thought particularly rich in resources.
Grotius and his successors entered the problem in behalf of
their own states' unilateral claims to navigate, trade and
to utilize the resources of the sea. 2
Grotius and his contemporaries were motivated by prac-
tiCal considerations, unlike the early Roman jurists who
had dealt principally with theoretical concept. In his
classic, Marc Liberum, Grotius upheld Dutch trading and
navigation rights in the Indies and challenged Portuguese
claims and the Papal right to grant title to the sea.
The cultural thesis of Grotius was that the sea was
free for all, and that no one could gain ownership of a
4
property by possession without occupation. The implication
is that if the ocean caRnot be occupied effectively, it i Q
res communis, it "belongs to no one and open equally to
alI." 3 Yet he excepted the belt of sea "visible from
shore" from the compelling arguments by which he establishes
the doctrine of "Freedom of the Seas."
Grotius' views were attacked by many other authors.
One of his most distingu~shed adversaries was an Englishmen,
John Selden. In 1618, Selden replied \·,ith his Marc Alaus~
(the closed sea) controverting theories of natural law with
the fact that parts of the sea had actually been appropri-
ated by England. In the eighteenth century, however,
Grotius' Marc ~iberum gradually gained support from other
writers. Notable among them was another Dutchman, Cornelius
von Bynkershoek, whose The Dominio Maris Dissertatio (Free-
dom of the Seas) was published in 1703. 4
As a result of the publication of Bynkershoek's wOrk at
the beginning of the 18th Century, the question of the
appropriation of the sea opened another debate. Bynkcrshoek
was concerned in his Freedom of the Seas with the question
of delimitation of the territorial sea immediately adjacent
to the coast. lIe recognized the fact that the seas could
be effectively occupied to the maritime belt measured by
the range of a cannon shot.
5
Bynkershoek assigned the dominion of the adjacent sea
(Marc Proximum) to the neighboring state within the range
of a cannon shot. Margina~ waters were thus subject to
possession, to occupation and, therefore, to ownership.
This extension of the sovereignty of a state beyond the
limits of its land territory is based today on the principle
that the territorial sovereign has a ri9'ht. to control .1 ts
own territory and to protect its interests by controlling
the waters adjacent to its sovereignty. 5
In 1783 Secretary of State J,efferson, in diplomatic
correspondence, noted that the limit which had gained rec-
ognition among nations was the maximum range of a cannon
ball. Thereafter the United States recognized the sea
league, or IIThree geographical miles" as its territorial
6
sea.
From the time of Grotius into the present century, the
free use of the seas by ships of all count.ries has developed
into an internationally accepted prinoiple. Inherent in
that principle, and developing as a matter of customary
practice, is the right of ships to pass through the terri-
torial waters of foreign countries without interference by,
or subjection to the jurisdiction of, the littoral state.
Although the concept of innocent passage is universally
accepted as an abstract principle, the practice of states
6
has not been uniform, and disagreements exist today as to
the implementation thereof.
McDougal and Reisman sum up the concept of freedom of
the seas by stating:
"Freedom of the sea" is, thus, no absolute,
and never has been. It is, as it was in the be-
ginning, a legal conclusion invoked to justify a
policy preference for certain unilateral asser-
tions as against others. The claims it favors
are those to the utmost freedom for navigation,
fishing, and other pursuits thought to further
the most productive use of the sea and its
resources, and thus to promote the community
interest. It combats monopolistic claims, and
minimizes international friction by confining
each state's regulatory power, where possible, to
ships flying its own flag, thus avoiding wrangles
over seizure of ships7and crews and other inci-
dents of enforcement.
For approximately 300 years prior to 1945 the dominant
Western colonial powers considered the world ocean to be
divided into two basic zones. The first zone was that of
the territorial sea, a narrow band of water along the coasts
of each country within which that country could exercise
sovereignty. Every other nation's surface vessels had the
right of innocent passage so long as the passage was not
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the
coastal state. Up until the mid-20th century the maximum
breadth of the territorial sea was generally considered to
be three nautical miles.
The second zone consisted of the vast majority of the
ocean outside of the territorial sea and was commonly
i
referred to as the I'high seas" where freedom of the seas
reigned and these seas were not sUbject nor subjectable to
any nation's sovereignty.
Post-1945: With few exceptions the world, until 1945,
accepted the fact that a nation's territorial jurisdiction
over adjacent sea areas should be quite limited. The three~
mile ~erritorial sea prevailed. In 1945, however, President
Truman, by proclamation, set in motion a policy which pre-
cipitated significant changes. 8 While avoiding a strictly
territorial claim the Truman Proclamation did assert United
States jurisdiction and control of the natural resources
and the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf con-
tiguous to the Unit~d States' coasts. Although it stated
no outer boundary as such, it used the term "continental
shelf" which was described in an accompanying press release
as generally extending to a point where the water reaches a
9depth of 600 feet.
Not only was the United States' assertion of jurisdic-
tion and control over its continental shelf accepted by the
international community without any objection, but several
other states followed suit and issued proclamations assert~
ing claims over their respective continental shelves and
reserving exclusive rights to exploitation of the subsoil
outside their coasts. By 1958, some twenty states had
claimed sovereign rights over their respective continental
8
shelves. The content of these proclamations and the nature
of the rights claimed under them varied considerably. While
some of the proclamations invoked the claim to exclusive
justification and control, others spoke of sovereignty and
of unqualified incorporation into the national territor.y of
submarine areas. While some referred to the continental
shelf, others mentioned che sea bed and its subsoil adjacent
to their national territory. Some defined the area of the
continental shelf by reference to the depth of the sea.
Others were silent on the subject or lef~ the extent of the
areas in question to be determined by future agreements.
While some declarations were limited in claims over the
continental shelf or submarine areas, others combined such
announcements with a claim to jurisdiction or sovereignty
. 10
over the superjacent waters and alr space.
In 1947 Peru claimed a 200-mile zone as aid Chile. In
1952 Chile, Peru and Ecuador joined in the Santiago Deelara-
tion affirming the legality of 200-mile zones upon which
Ecuador asserted a 200-mile territorial sea. Since the
Santiago Declaration these three eountries have many times
set forth various legal rationales for their claim. One of
their arguments is that if the United States had a unilat-
eral right to claim the resources of the sea beds adjacent
to its coast to the exclusion of all other countries, they
9
too had a similar right to make claims consistent with their
own national interests.
Claims were so widespread by 1958 that the United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was convened in
Geneva from February 24 to April 28, 1958. This conference
was one of the most important international conferences
held, in that it was the first serious attempt ever made by
governments of the world to codify international law. 11
This conference derived its importance from several
facts. First, it was attended by all of the major maritime
states of the world, including most, but ndt all of the
members of the United Nations plus some important non-member
states such as Switzerland. Moreover, the list of partici-
pants included several Land-locked states, emphasizing their
interest in the utilization of the ocean resources of the
world.
Second, the Conference was the most important held to
date on the law of the sea because of its broad scope and
its accomplishments. Four conventions, an optional protocol
and nine resolutions, ranging over most major aspects of
maritime legislation, were adopted. The four conventions
dea~t with: territorial seas and zones adjacent to them;
the general regime of the high seas; fishing rights and
conservation of the living resources of the high seas; and
exploration and exploitation of the resources of the
10
continental shelf. Under the terms of the optional pro-
tocol, all ~Quntries signing it agreed to recognize the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice in disputes arising out of conventions on the law
of the sea. The nine resolutions dealt mainly with related
't' t 12marl lIDs rna ters.
Thirdly, the 1958 Geneva Convention can be considered
of major importance in that it represented the first major
United Nations Codification Confexence, which set the pat-
tern for similar future conclaves under the aegis of the
United Nations.
Finally, the 1958 Conference is of particular signi-
ficance in that the participatory delegates viewed with
determination their continuing duty to seek a solution to
those problems on which agreement could not be reached in
1958. T'he Conference approved a resolution requesting the
General Assembly to consider convening a second interna-
tional conference for further study of questions left
unsettled. 13
During the two years between conferences, extensive
preparations were made by many nations. The United Stat€s,
firmly convinced that six miles was the outer limit con-
sistent with security and limitations of neutrality patrol,
and fortified by the support for its compromise proposal at
the 1958 Conference, had its representatives from the Navy
11
and the Department of State visit nations allover the world
to secure support for the six-mile limit with si~ additional
miles of fishing control. While the United States preferred
a retention of a three-mile limit for a marginal sea, ana-
lysis of the voting at the 1958 Conference revealed that
such a limit had no reasonable chance of approval. 14
The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea met in Geneva from March 16 to April 26, 1960. Convened
in accor.dance with General Assembly Resolution of December
1958, the Conference was held to consider further ~he ques-
tions of the breadth of the territorial sea and fisheries
limits. The Conference was attended by 500 delegates from
88 countries and eight United Nations related agencies. IS
By 1960, more than 31 territorial sea claims exceeded
three miles, and at least 16 continental shelf c2aims of
one sort or another also exceeded three miles. Already
things were beginning to build up a certain momentum of
states making claims to extensive offshore areas. It was
this momentum that caused the 1958 and 1960 Law of the Sea
Conferences to be held in the first place. The main output
of these two conferences can be seen as a sort of first-
stage victory for the coastal state moveme,nt. What the
conference did was to legitimatize, in a certain form,
claims to the continental shelf, thereby allowing the
coastal states a first claim at the areas off their shores.
12
It was agreed that coastal states could claim the conti~
nental shelf to a limit of 200 meters depth or the limits
of exploitation. This was, in fact, a major victory for
the coastal s~ate movement. There was no resolution at the
Conference on the question of the width of the territorial
sea, but most of the argument was within the area of 6-12
miles, indicating that the territorial sea limits of the
Id ' bl" 16o reg1rne were crum 1ng.
The failure of both the 1958 and the 1960 United Nations
Conferences on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I and II) was
indicative of the more general failure of the International
Law Commission and both UNCLOS I and II to consider the
significance of the trend toward coastal nations who were
not global maritime powers.
UNCLOS III: The decade of the sixties witnessed rapid
and radical transformations of world-wide scale. Techno-
logical developments spurred by the arms race, space explor-
ation, and economic growth have had lasting effects that
have transcended local and national interests. The 1960s
saw the final disintegration of colonial empires and the
accession of many new states to independence, especially in
Africa and Asia. These nations were wary of the existing
international legal and economic order established prior to
their independence and which systematically suppLessed their
national aspirations for many years. These new nations
13
constitute what is referred to as the IIThird World" coun-
tries. It was this international and economic order that,
'from their perspective, kept the people of the ~hird World
under colonial rule and subjected their natural resources
to centuries of exploitation. It is no wonder that these
new states felt no obligation to observe conventions in
which they did not share in formulating and which neither
recognized nor acknowledged many of their legitimate rights.
Consequently, Third World nations have felt little or no
constraints in proposing changes in the international legal
and economic order that are contrary to existing principles.
As active participants in world politics, Third World coun-
tries are seeking to redress the imbalance in the interna-
tional legal and economic order. UNCLOs III has provided
the'In with a most appropriate forum to right, what they see,
are the many wrongs of past centuries.
The main instrumentality through which the Third World
has advanced its views and positions on the Law of the Sea
negotiations has been the Group of 77 which first mace it-
self felt as a force espousing Third World economic inter-
ests was 1964. By achieving consensus on important and
often controversial issues and by devising appropriate
strategies, the Group of 77 has enabled developing nations
to play an active role in the formulation of the final
version of the Law of the Sea Treaty.17 "The demands of
14
Third World states for the establishment of a new interna-
tional economic order are highly relevant to the negotia-
tions at UNCLOS III and help make understandable, though
not necessarily palatable, their view's and what they desire
to achieve at that conference. illS
The Law of the Sea Treaty that was opened for signature
in December 1982 is the outcome of negotiations that began
in 1973. UNCLOS was convened in order to create an all-
encompassing framework for regulating the sea. The most
important and controversial features of the Treaty concern
rights of navigation through and flight over straits and
the regime for mining the deep sea bed. Other provisions,
of course, include the management and protection of fisher-
ies, conservation of the environment, continental shelf oil
and gas production, scientific research and dispute settle-
ment. Freedom of navigation was an issue because, as we
have seen, an increasing number of states claimed sover-
eignty over waters extending twelve or more miles from their
shores. The major powers were becoming concerned about
this erosion of the traditional three-mile limit because it
threatens unimpeded passage through militarily and commer-
cialLy important straits. The United States and the Soviet
Union strongly desired to reestablish a universally accepted
regime to forestall challenges to the right of transit over
and through critical maritime chokepoints. The other
15
central issue in the negotiations was the deep sea bed,
which western companies wanted to mine. The large invest-
ment required to undertake this activity makes necessary a
stable regime of guaranteed access and secure tenure.
Prior to the first session of UNCLOS which opened in
Caracas in 1973, the United States and the other interested
western nations made a concession that was to influence
significantly the outcome of the proceedings. They agreed
that all issues relating to the law of the sea would be
negotiated and resolved at UNCLOS. Addressing so many dif-
ficult issues in the same negotiations ensured that the
proceedings would be mired in complexity, and that conces-
sions in one area would be traded for benefits in another.
Anti-western rhetoric and Third World demands for resource
transfer became important elements in the proceedings.
Because most participants had few if any tangible interests
in the law of the sea, they could advance ideological
demands on nations with an important stake in a successful
outcome. Because Third World agreement was required for
the convention to become effective, western negotiators
were strongly influenced to make concessions to states whose
only negotiating asset was the right to assent to or to
J 9'reject the Treaty •.
The Law of the Sea III Convention was a long time in
session as we have seen. Preparatory negotiations star~ed
16
in 1967-68 within the framework of the UN Seabed Committee,
and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS III) starting in 1973 had# over the past nine
years, worked itself thrQugh some twelve regular sessions,
several intersessional meetings, and several informal nego-
tiating texts. As a result of the experiences of the pre-
vious attempts to resolve major ocean issues, it was very
strongly felt that it would be an exercise in futility to
draw up a draft convention that would be unacceptable to
one or more of the main groupings within the UN. If any of
the main groupings of nations remain outside of the Conven-
tion, then the Conference would be a failure in its' two
main functions, viz. to create a political and legal system
for the oceans acceptable to all, and to create the neces-
sary conditions for an effective management of the "Common
heritage" of the oceans.
The Third United Nations Conference on The Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS III~ is constantly referred to as the most
ambitious treaty-making attempt ever undertaken by the world
community. 20 The Draft Convention on The Law of the Sea
is extremely complicated. In nine years of negotiations
roughly 160 states argued over a new law of the sea and
finally agreed on a Convention aiming at universal validity
with its 320 articles, nine annexes and five resolutions
17
covering every use of the ocean and all categories of sea,
or 71 percent of the surface area of the world.
The first substantive session of UNCLOS III took place
in the summer of 1974. In 1975 frustration had begun to
show itself with the slow negotiations. This led the con-
ference to accept the suggestion that the Chairmen of the
three main committees submit texts containing drqft pro-
visions which appeared to command significant support. ~he
President of the Conference and the three main Committee
Chairmen have played an unprecedente~ role in the Confer-
ence. In taking upon themselves the task of preparing the
informal negotiating texts, they have in effect presented
comprehensive consecutive draft texts of the Convention.
These texts have served as visible signs of the progress of
the negotiations and at the same time as the bases of dis-
cussions in the Conference. This approach was highly suc-
cessful.
The substantive work of the Conference took place in
the three main comnlittees and subcommittees and negotiating
groups. The First Committee was charged with drafting
articles pertaining to the international area and the inter-
national organization--the Seabed Authority.
The Second Committee was entrusted with the somewhat
conventional issues of the oceans, i.e., territorial sea,
high seas, straits, management of the living resources of
18
the oceans, in addition, the new concepts of the 200~mile
economic zone and of the land-locked and geographically
disadvantaged countries.
The Third Committee was charged specifically with three
well defined tasks, namely, to draft articles on the pro-
tection and preservation of the marine environment; Marine
scien~ific research and the development and transfer of
21technology.
UNCLOS III had to face, early on, the problem of adop-
tion of procedural rules that would affect the diplomacy of
the conference to a great degree. A straightforward voting
procedure was not acceptable because of the superior numer-
ical strengths of developing countries compared to that of
the developed states as mentioned earlier in thLS discussion.
Since it was the developed states that wanted and had the
capability of harvesting the resources of the oceans, it
was to the advantage of the developing countries to attempt
to accommodate these interests in the hope of gaining some
return for themselves. The complexity and interrelationship
of the issues, and the importance put on ocean resources by
the States, make a straight voting procedure inappropriate.
'I'he fust session of UNCLOS III ended without a determina-
tion of the appropriate procedural rules, however, the
second session in 1974 produced an agreement.
19
The rules adopted did not allow for voting, but were
very clear that votinq should be a last resort and that the
Conference should proceed by consensus.
As a general approach to reaching agreement 1n the
United Nations system consensus has been increasingly used
to, "avoid a clash or a clearly black and white vote in the
international community where large majorities are pre-
existing. It is used, also, to safaguard the rights of all
part-icipants. "22
Consensus does not mean unanimity, since that implies
positive support. Rather, it means a convexgence of opinion
and the absence of strong disagreement from States and the
willingness for a matter to pass without formal objection.
"The consensus principle is the cornerstone of the decision-
making process. n23
Closely related to the consensus approach is the concept
of a package deal. The package deal entails that all the
main parts of the Convention must be looked upon as an
entity, as a single negotiated package, where the laws of
give and take have presumably struck a reasonable balance
between the participating states. This concept of the
p~ckage deal has obvious merits for a convention of this
magnitude and complexity. It also seems a precondition for
adopting the Convention by consensus. "Conseque,ntly,
national administrations, still insisting on the necessity
20
of preserving national and nationalistic viewpoints, are
more and more compelled to face international decision~ on
interests which often conflict."24
From December 1973 to the opening of the Treaty for
signature in December 1982 the UNCLOS 111 had twelve formal
meetings and produced the treaty with 17 parts and some 320
articles and 9 technical annexes. It was during the
eleventh session on April 30, 1982, in New York, where it
was determined that all efforts at reaching general ~gree­
ment were exhausted, that the Conference voted, at the
request of the United States, on the issue of adopting the
'Convention on the Law of the Sea. Everyone knew that the
hope that had guided the extensive work over the past nine
years and the hope for consensus on this work was not to be
realized. The request for the recorded vote was delivered
to the Conference President in writing. The vote was 130
countries in favor, 4 voted against--including the U.S.--
and 17 countries abstained and 4 did not participate in the
vote. So far as the delegates and observers were concerned
they acknowledged the magnitude of the achievement. After
93 weeks of meetings and thousands of hours of private con-
sultations, a broad agreement had been reached on all
matters relating to the law of the sea.
Parts of the Convention are consistent with the United
States' interests and would contribute to the advancement
21
of our national goals. Other provisions are contrary to
the United States' interests, as outlined by the present
Administration after its review of UNCLOS III in 1981-82.
To attempt to capitalize on the positive aspects of the
Treaty, while at the same time defending against the adverso
impacts, will be a very difficult task. It is certain that
~he U.S. will find it necessary to adjust its existing ocean
policy during the coming years.
The United States will not be able to isolate itself
from the impacts of the possible significant changes In
maritime law that are sure to transpire in the years to
corne. As was mentioned earlier in this discussion it is
likely that the Treaty will come into force sometime within
this decade and the actions of individual states lead~ng to
this event will require the u.s. to have a broad range of
responses.
The question arises at this point as to what has the
United States been doing during all of the negotiations?
If the Treaty is so unacceptable from the u.s. perspective,
how does it happen that we have arrived at such an impasse?
After all, the U.S. had been a principal initiator in
causin9 UNCLOS III to happen.
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CHAPTER III
The Crucial u.s. Role:
Significant U.S. Initiatives
The ans~er to the ~uestion raised at the close o£ the
pr.eceding chapter as to what the U.S. has been doing is
that the u.s. has been very busy creating the very Treaty
that we now repudiate. We must look at the U.S. record
starting with the 1945 Truman Proclamations which were dis-
cussed briefly in the preceding chapter. These proclama-
tions instigated or at least accelerated the coastal nation
expansion. The United States, with more interest than any
otfler nation in preserving norms of free enterprise and
free navigation, upset the apple cart when President Truman
made the two famous declarations. As we have seen, the
first claimed exclusive jurisdiction over the resources of
the Continental Shelf, with the important qualification
that this did not affect the status of the superjacent
waters as high seas. The second, issued simultaneously,
qualified the qualification by asserting its jurisdiction
and control over fishing only by our nationals, and jointly
with others whose nationals had historical fishing claims.
As we have seen many states followed the U.S. position
and claimed their various areas under their national con-
trol. By the late 19605 this trend so concerned the U.S.
in its role as a global ocean power thqt we entered into
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discussions with the Soviet Union as to what action could
be taken to impede this impending threat to freedom of
navigation, especially through str~its as they are affected
by the trend for a twelve mile territorial sea. The two
countries agreed that a new law of the sea conference should
be convened and both nations began to promote the idea.
The United States, as the leading maritime power and as
the most advanced country in ocean technology, could not
ignore the fast changing law of the sea and the inevitable
course of events. Announcing a new ocean policy for the
United States on May 23, 1970, President Nixon emphasized
that the law of the sea is inadequate to meet the needs of
modern technology and the concerns of the international
community. He said that if not modernized multilaterally,
unilateral action and international conflict were inevit-
able. He proposed that all nations adopt a treaty in which
they would renounce all claims over the natural resources
of the seabed beyond the point where the high seas reach a
depth of 200 meters. Everyone was to agree that these
resources would be regarded as the common heritage of man-
. d 1k1n .
Beyond the limit suggested, the Treaty should also
establish an international regime for the exploitation of
the resources of the seabed. This regime is supposed to
provide for the collection of mineral royalties that would
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be used for international community purposes, in particular
for economic assistance to developing countries. The regime
is to lay down rules to prevent unreasonable interference
with the other uses of the sea. The protection against
ocean pollution, assurance of the integrity of investments
ana provisions for a peaceful and mandatory settlement of
disputes were also spelled out in this announcement.
Beyond the 200-meter isobath, it was proposed that two
types of machinery for exploitation be used. The first was
that coastal nations act as trus~ees for the international
community in the trustee zone which would be comprised of
the continental margins beyond 200 meters off the coasts.
Each coastal state would, in return, receive a share of the
international revenues from the zone in which it acts as
trustee and could, if desired, impose additional taxes.
The second type of machinery proposed concerned the
area beyond the continental margins and would authorize and
regulate exploration and use of seabed resources beyond the
Continental margins.
since the negotiations for these proposals were so com-
plex and would take considerable time to form a treaty, it
was suggested that, for the interim period, a grandfather
clause be in effect where leases and permits for depths
greater than 200 meters would be issued, subject to the
iAternational regime to be agreed upon, and that the regime
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should include necessary protection for the integrity of
the investments made in the interim period.
The proposal also suggested that the conclusion of a
new treaty should provide for the establishment of a 12-mile
limit for territorial waters and for free transit throughout
2-international straits.
o~ August 3, 1970, the United States submitted a draft
of President Nixon's proposals entitled, "United Nations
convention on the International Seabed Area," as a working
paper for discussion purposes, to the United Nations Seabed
Comm1'ttee. 3 Th" d ft d f d 11S ra was prepare a ter a great ea
of thought and thorough study and laid down in great detail
the President's proposals and included many recommendations.
It designated all areas of the seabed and the subsoil of
the high seas seaward of the 200-~eter isobath adjacent to
the coast of continents and islands as the International
Seabed Area which was to be considered the common heritage
of mankind and reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes.
It also specified that no state could claim or exercise
sovereignty or rights over any part of the Seabed Area or
its resources. It also proposed that each state that is a
contracting party would not recognize any claim of sover~
eignty by another state. A final major point of this draft
was that no state may acquire any right, title, or interest
in the International Seabed Area or its resources except as
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provided in the draft. This Nixon proposal was a most gen-
erous concession to the Third World.
Most states--especially the newly independent, develop-
ing countries--were in the process of studying their inter-
est and had not made up their minds as to where their inter-
ests lie. They, therefore, did not wish to be hurried into
accepting any limitations on their sovereign rights. In
any event, they wanted to keep their options open. And as
events passed the Nixon proposals were not accepted. Partly
because so little was known so far as the geography and
geology of rnos~ of the continental margins, partly because
most of the countries were unaware of the extent of mineral
resources of the sea or partly because nations had not been
able to assess all of their interests, most countries
responded with caution and hesitance to the U.S. proposals
for any scheme that would delimit the legal continental
shelf. 4
In 1976 UNCLOS III was well underway. Through tremen-
dous efforts on the part of the United States' navigation
rights, including straits passage, were already part of the
treaty package. The Conference, however, was bogged down
on the deep seabed regime. Basically, the nations repre-
senting private miners were stressing a simple licensing
scheme and an otherwise unrestricted access to seabed
minerals by private miners. The Group of 77 preferred a
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new International Seabed Authority that would itself exclu~
sively mine the deep seabed. The producers of minerals
from land-based sources wanted production restrictions
placed in the treaty to protect them from competition from
seabed minerals mining enterprises.
The Third World wanted the seabed regime to be a New
International Economic Order (NIEO) model, and the industri-
alized nations wanted it to be proof of the viability of
the traditional international system. Therefore, the seabed
issue was also a struggle over the precedent-setting effect
that the seabed regime would have for future North-South
negotiations on other issues. "What is favored, then, by
developed states is an extension of opportunities for com-
mercial activity in the seabeds of the deep ocean areas
under essentially traditional circumstances. The
developing states, however, perceive UNCLOS III as a major
opportunity to realize ideals of an NIEO, . to the
developing states the precedential value of decisions taken
on deep seabed mining may weigh more heavily than the prac-
t . , f th' d . . b d .. " 5~ca~ consequences 0 elr eClSlon on sea e mln~ng.
The question of who should have the right to exploit
the deep seabed resources had to be settled before the
question of conditions of mining could be dealt with.
The confrontation of the two opposing regime philoso-
phies had led to a stalemate in the seabed negotiations in
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fthe Seabed Committee, and the stalemate continued. The
United States and other industrialized nations presented
various drafts which contained variations of a license
system. The Group of 77 presented a single common draft
which gave the International Seabed Authority exclusive
jurispiction over the deep seabed. This proposal was com-
pletely unacceptable to the industrialized countries since
it did not guarantee the access to the seabed they demanded.
A compromise was in order and the obvious was a mixed
or a parallel system in which both national companies and
the Enterprise would be allowed to operate independently.
As mentioned earlier, such a system had been suggested but
received little notice. It began to attract attention when,
at Geneva in 1975, the United states and the Soviet Union
began to give the idea support. At this session the United
States presented what was called a banking system, a two
area system in which national companies would apply to the
Authority for two seabed mine sites of equal commercial
value. Tbe International Seabed Authority would issue a
license to the national company for one site and reserve
the other for itself to exploit, alone or in joint venture
with national companies, possibly from the Third World.
At the negotiating sessions at Geneva in 1975, the work-
ing group chairman was Mr. Pinto of Sri Lanka. Pinto pr@-
sented a paper which borrowed from Ehe Group of 77, the
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Soviet Union and the United States' drafts and combined
them into a single plan. The main idea of this plan was
based on a joint venture between the International Seabed
Authority and national companies, but it included the two-
area system and provisions for the transfer of technology
to developing countries. This Pinto plan represented a
first attempt at moving toward a compromise based on some
sort of parallel system. The Pinto plan did not meet with
success.
The industrialized countries and a small number of Third
World countries were willing to negotiate on the basis of
this Pinto text but the majority of the Group of 77 rejected
any consideration of the parallel system. According to the
Third World, the parallel system contradicted the essence
of the concept of common heritage. Their thinking was that
the common heritage belonged to mankind collectively and
was not divisible and must be regulated and controlled under
. 6
one reglme.
A number of Third World countries supported the Pinto
initiative to reach a compromise. These countries were
primarily those land-based producers of minerals. They
would rather have no seabed mining at all, but should UNCLOS
III fail, then the subsequent unrestricted unilateral seabed
mining would be disastrous to their economic welfare.
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No compromise was reached at the third session at Geneva
in 1975, and an Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT) was
issued, at the close of thnt session, which was very much
the Group of 77's position from the start of the negotiations
and was unacceptable to the industrialized nations.
During the intersessional period between 1975 and 1976
and at the fourth session in New York in 1976, the Secretary
of State, Henry Kissinger became personally involved in an
attempt to get the Convention moving and pushing for a reso-
lution on the seabed mining issue. Kissinger outlined the
u.S. position on the law of the sea negotiations before the
American Bar Association in August 1975. He reiterated the
United States support for a parallel system and then said
that if ~ssential u.s. interests were guaranteed, the Onited
States would be prepared to explore ways of sharing deep
seabed technology with other nations. 7 Though vaguely
worded, this concession was the first indication that the
u.s. was willing, as a compromise, to help make the Enter-
prise operational if the parallel system was accepted.
Secretary Kissinger appeared in New York on several
occasions during and in between the fourth and fifth ses-
sions of the Conference. In a speech before the Foreign
Policy Association, the u.s. Council of the International
Chamber of Commerce and the U.N. Association of the U.S.A.
he recalled everyone's attention ~o his speech in Montreal
31
the previous summer in which the U.S. comprehensive program
was offered in the hope of concluding the UNCLOS III nego-
tiations in 1976. He then went on to offer new proposals
addressing the remaining important issues so that the
negotiations could lead to a £inal result that year. He
repeated the parallel system for mining proposal; the U.S.
willingness to share technology
. . . Finally, the United States is prepared to
make a major effort. to enhance the skills and
access of developing countries to advanced deep
seabed mining technology inSorder to assist their
capabilities in this field.
He added a new concession not put forward by the U.S. before
. in response to the legitimate concerns of
land-based producers of minerals found in the
deep seabeds, we offer the following major contri-
bution to the negotiations: The United States is
prepared to accept a temporary limitation, for a
period fixed in the treaty, on production of the
seabed minerals tied to the projected growth in
the world nickel market, . After this period,
the seabed production 9hould be governed by over-
all market conditions.
What Secretary Kissinger said was that the U.S. waS willing
to accept a preventative approach to solving the problems
of land-based producers. Although the arrangement was to
be fixed in time, it was, in fact, a major concession. The
Montreal and the New York speeches included clear statements
of unilateral action on the 0.S. part if agreement was not
reached soon.
The United States believes that the world
community has before it a grave responsibility.
Our country cannot delay in its efforts to develop
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an assured supply of critical resources through
our deep seabed mining projects. We strongly
prefer an international agreement . But if
agreement is not reached this year, it will be
increas~ngly diffi~Blt to resist pressure to pro-
ceed un1laterally.-
The combination of inducement-threat strategy seemed
to work for a brief period until the fifth session in August-
September 1976. The Group of 77 gathered the majority behind
them in a total rejection of the parallel system, which.
brought the negotiations back to where they were after the
1974 Caracas session, in a deadlocked position.
secretary Kissinger again appears in New York on Septem-
ber 1, and in a speech made at a reception for heads of
delegations to the Conference on the Law of the Sea, he
brought up the problem of how 'to enable the Enterprise to
become operational. He reviewed the last session where the
U.S. parallel system was proposed a~d reflected in the
negotiating text. He pointed out that many countries have
expressed reservations on the grounds that the international
community did not possess the financial resources with which
to mine or even to put the Enterprise in business, and if
the transfer of technology to the international community
were net provided for, then they could not support the
11parallel system.
We have taken these views into serious con-
sideration. on the occasion of my meeting
with some of the members of Committee I, I pro-
posed on behalf of the U.S. Government that the
United States would be prepared to agree to a
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means of financing the Enterprise in such a manner
that the Enterprise could begin its mining opera-
tion either concurrently -with . . . state or pri-
vate enterprises or within an agf!ed time span
that was practically concurrent.
The proposal also included agreed provisions for the trans-
fer of technology and a proposal for periodic review at
intervals to be negotiated, but suggested to be 25 years,
because some viewed that it might be premature to establish
a permanent regime for the deep seabeds.
What this all means is that the United States has been
very active and has made serio~s efforts to move the Con-
ference forward. Secretary Kissinger again warned toe
delegates, "But there are limits beyond which no American
leader can go. And if those limits are attempted to be
exceeded, then we will find ourselves in the regrettable
and tragic situation where at sea--just as previously on
land--unilateralism will reign supreme . We in the
United States would not, in the short term, have any dis-
13
advantage from this--quite on the contrary."
In 1976 both the United States and the Soviet Union
introduced a 200-mile fisheries zone. The United States
fisherman had become impatient witb the progress of UNCLOS
III and were pressuring the Congress for action agains~
both the Sovi~t Union and Japan whose fishing boats and
fac~ory ships were within sight of the coasts of the U.S.
The State Department was, of course, against any action
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that would adversely impact on the UNCLOS III negotiations
and the Department of Defense was, as we have seen, against
any legislation that would seem to approve of creeping
jurisdiction. However, President Ford signed the Fishing
Conservation and Management Act of 1976 into law.
The act which established an exclusive 200 mile zone
for U.S. fishery managem.ent declared that
. . • The activities of massive foreign fishing
fleets in waters adjacent to such coastal areas
have contribu~ed to such damage, inte~fered with
domestic fishing efforts, and caused destruction
of th!4fishing gear of the United States fishermen
Under the provisions stating the purpose of the act
Congress declared,
. . to take immediate action to conserve and
manage the fishery resources found off the coasts
of the United States ..• by establishing (A) a
fishery conservation zone within which the United
states will assume exclusive fishery management
authority over all fish, except highly migratory
species, and (B) exclusive fishery management
authority beyond such zone over anadromous sPISies
and continental shelf fishery resources . . .
Congress further declared its policy to be
• . . to maintain without change the existing
territorial or other ocean jurisdiction of the
Uni ted States. . to slilpport and encourage con-
tinued active United States efforts to obtain an
internationally acceptable treaty, at the Third
Un~ted Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
which provides for effective conI6rvation andmanagement of fishery resources.
The State Department concern was understandable from a
negotiation point of view. By unilaterally introducing
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what a majority of states were seeking in the UNCLOS pro-
cess, the United States contributed to legitimizing what
had already been proposed as par~ of the package concept
without getting the quid pro quo: treaty guaranteed
navigation ri~hts. The United States, in effect, lost some
bargaining power.
The option for unilateral action exists in other areas,
such as deep seabed mining. To take unilateral action in
this area, however, requires that the technology and capital
investment be available to the state claiming this action.
The threat to take unilateral action in the area of deep
seabed mining had been espoused by the United States in the
years since UNCLOS III began its slow progress generally,
and specifically during the period characterized by lack of
progress in the area of deep seabed mining. This threat
was given real substance in the summer of 1980, when
Congress passed and President Carter signed the Deep Seabed
Hard Mineral Resources Act, Public Law 96-283. This act
makes it possible for the united States mining industry to
plan the start of commercial mining of deep seabed minerals
after January 1, 1988. Included in the findings and
purposes of the Act, Congress finds that
• it is the legal opinion of the United
States that exploration for and commercial
recovery of hard mineral resources of the aeep
seabed are freedoms of the high seas subject to a
duty of reasonable regard to the interests of
other states in their exercise of those and othe~
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freedoms recognized by general principles of
international law . . - . legislation is required
to establish an interim legal regime under which
technology can be developed and the exploration
and recovery of the hard mineral resources of the
deep seabed can take place until such time as a
Law of the Sea Treaty enters t~to force with
respect to the United States.
William c. Brewe~, Jr. claims that this U.S. action
caused a storm of protest within the negotiations with
allegations of bad faith on the part of the U.S. negotia-
tions. "It is not yet clear, however, whether the United
states legislation actually slowed the progress of negotia-
tion by making further concessions less palatable to the
G-77, or whether the display of United States resolve had
in fact expedited it." 18
Whatever the case, the record shows that the ninth
ses-sion at Nevi York and Geneva in 1980 and the tenth
session in New York in 1981 produced the first official
text of the draft convention which was issued during this
session. Jamaica and the Federal Republic of Germany were
chosen as seats for the International Seabed Authority and
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea respec-
tively. The United States is still not satisfied with the
seabed provisions.
The United States announced on March 2, 1981 that there
were some serious concerns raised within the United States,
specifically with respect to deep seabed mining provisions
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of the draft convention, and that the new Reagan Administra-
tion would review the proposed draft convention before
negotiations were ended.
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CHAPTER IV
The u.s. Interests and the
Law of the Sea III Treaty
At the end of the ninth session of the Law of the Sea
Conference in 1980, there was general agreement that pro-
gress was moving ahead such that 1981 would see the adoption
of the Convention. However, on the eve of the March 1981
tenth session, the U.S. delegation was instructed to ensure
that the negotiations did not end at that session. "Dele-
gates to the tenth session were therefore stunned by the
announcement of the United States government made only days
before the session opened that the United States would not
agree to the adoption of a convention at the session and
that a back-to-the-beginning review would have to be con-
ducted ,,1
This announcement should not have been such a surprise
to anyone when you consider the fact that the U.S. had
repeatedly stated that it was not satisfied with the pro-
visions relating to the deep seabed aspects of the conven-
tion. "The concern of the Senate about the Law af the Sea
is not recent. The Senate has in the past and will, I
trust, in the future consider this matter in a totally
bipartisan spirit. It 2
This discussion will limit itself to those aspects of
the ~reaty dealing with the freedom of navigation and
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overflight for both military and commercial vessels and
aircraft and with some of the provisions of the draft con-
vention on deep Seabed mining.
After the u.s. announcement Ehat the Administration
wished to review the Convention, James L. Malone, Chairman
of the u.s. delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference
made a statement before the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives on April 29, 1981 in which he out-
lined the Administrations' policies toward the review. 3
He stated that some of the features of the draft convention
raise cereain questions as they relate to consistency with
u.S. interests. These areas of concern include
- The establishment of a supernational mining
company--the Enterprise--which would benefit
from significant discriminatory advantages
relative to the companies of industrialized
countries. The Enterprise could eventually
monopolize production.
- The convention requires the u.s. and others to
fund the initial capitalization of this orga-
nization in proportion to their contributions
to the U.N.
- Compels the sale of technology to the Enterprise
and to developing countries. The Enterprise,
through the manda~ory transfer provisions, is
guaranteed access on request to the seabed
mining technology owned by private companies
and also technology used by them but owned by
others. The text also guarantees similar access
to privately owned technology by any developing
country planning to enter seabed mining.
- Limits the annual production of nodules as well
as the amount which anyone company can mine
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for the first twenty years. This is an attempt
to insulate land-based producers from
competition.
~ The International Seabed Authority is granted
wide discretion to select among competing appli-
cations to mine which could be used to deny
contra.cts to qualified u.S. companies.
- Creates a one nation, one vote international
organization governed by an assembly aFid a 36
member executive council. In the council the
Soviet Union and its allies have three guar-
anteed seats, the U.S. must compete with its
allies for any representation.
- Provides that, after 15 years of production,
the provisions of the treaty will be reviewed
to determine whether it has fulfilled overriding
policy considerations, such as protection of
land-based producers, promotion of Enterprise
operations and equitable distribution of mining
rights.
- If two-thirds of the states' parties to the
treaty wish to amend provisions concerning the
system of exploration, they may do so after 5
years of negotiation and after ratification by
two-thirds of the states' parties. This means
that the U.S. would be bound by the changes
even if we disagree with them unless we were to
denounce the entire treaty.
- No provision is made for protecting investments
made prior to entry of the treaty into force.
Mr. Malone stressed that, during the review, an evalua-
tion of all of our national interests and objectives will
be accomplished, including national security, to determine
the extent to which they are protected by the Convention,
and to identify any necessary modifications required to the
draft. He also stated that the review would examine whether
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these interests and objectives could fare for better or
worse without the Treaty.
We think that the w.orld community, too, will
be better served if we return to the Conference
with a realistic assessment of what will satisfy
our people and our Congress. The Administration
does not wish to be in a position of misleading
other countries into concluding a treaty they
will. expect us to ratify, a treaty which in ma.ny
respects is believed by them to satisfy our na-
~ional interests, .a~d the~ find t~e United St~tes
1S unable to part1c1pate ln the flnal result.
The review covered a period of ten months, ending on
January 29, 1982, when President Reagan announced that the
United States would return to the Law of the Sea negotia-
tions. 5 The President emphasized the importance of the
oceans as a source of helping supply the world's food and
energy demands and for their resource potential and then
outlined the changes that the United States wanted in the
deep seabed mining provisions. The specific changes out-
lined by the President are summarized below. In order to
satisfy the United States the Treaty should
- not deter development of any deep seabed mineral
resources;
- assure national access to resources to enhance
U.S. security and promote the economic develop-
ment of these resources;
- provide a fair decision-making role in the
regime that reflects and protects political,
economic and financial interests o~ states:
- not allow amendments to come into force without
approval of participating st~tes, including in
our case advice and consent of the Senate;
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- not set undesirable precedents for international
organizations;
and be likely to receive the consent of the
Senate. The mandatory transfer of private
technology and participation by and funding for
national liberation movements should not be in
the treaty provisions.
Deep seabed nodules are a vast potential source of
nickel, copper, cobalt, and maganese. As discussed in a
1982 Comptroller General report, the United States is
heavily dependent to varying degrees on foreign sources of
these minerals. In recent years we have imported about 98
percent Qf our cobalt, 97 percent of our maganese and about
73 percent of our nickel. In 1980 these commodities
totalled over one billion dollars. These three minerals
have been classified as critical under the Strategic and
Critical Materials Stockpiling Act. 6
The American mining industry has invested large sums of
money to develop seabed mining technology over the past
decade in search for exploitable ore deposits on the deep
seabeds of the oceans. However, full-scale development
depends upon an assurance of access to these resources and
also, a stable, secure investment climate is mandatory.
Access would serve our national strategic minerals policy
by providing security from foreign mineral imports. There
are, however, aspects of the Treaty which threaten the
security of access to these minerals and which make the
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investment climate for potential mining companies unattrac-
tive. Private companies seeking to raise capital necessary
to develop and employ seabed mining technology must be
assured that, once having made the investment, the~7 wiLL be
able to mine without unreasonable interference by interna~
tional bureaucracy.
AS proposed in the Treaty, deep seabed mining would be
governed by an International Seabed Authority (ISA), con-
sisting of an Assembly, a Council, a Secretariat and an
Enterprise. The Assembly is the supreme organ which pro-
vides general policy direction, elects the Council, the
Secretary General to run the Secretariat, and the Governing
Board and Director General of the Enterprise. ALI signatory
states to the Treaty are members of the ISA and the Assembly.
The Council consists of 36 members of the Authority, elected
by the Assembly. Each member of the Assembly has one vote.
The composition of the Council will include four members
having the largest investments in deep seabed mining,
including one Eastern Socialist European nation~ four from
among the major consuming or importing states, including
one Eastern Socialist European nation~ four from among the
major expoTting states of those minerals to be mined from
the seabed, including at least two developing states whose
exports of these minerals have a substantial bearing on
their economy~ six members from deve~oping nations
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representing special interests; and eighteen to assure
equitable geographical distribution with at least one from
Eastern Socialist Europe~
As can be seen the Eastern Socialist European states
have a guarantee of at least three seats on the Council.
When you also consider the Group of 77 seats plUS other
nations not necessarily friendly to the United States the
possibility of a voting imbalance could ultimately affect
access of U.S. mining companies to the seabed minerals since
there is no assurance that the Uni~ed States will be repre-
sented on the Council. This is particularly important when
it is realized that the Enterprise, at the direction and
control of the Council, will directly carry out the mining,
transporting, processing, and marketing of the seabed
minerals.
Exploration activities provided in the Treaty will be
carried out under a plan of work which must be approved by
the Council. Each mine site application will be large
enough to provide two separate and equal mining operations,
one of which will be reserved solely for mining by the
Authority. The work plans will be evaluated based on the
rules and regula.tions and acceptance, by the applicant, ot:
control by the Authority and its policies with respect to
activities in the area. The Council's Legal and Technical
Commission reviews the work plan and makes recommendations
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on all applications. The Treaty states that approval is
virtually automatic, the very outcome of the Commission's
decision making procedure remains a serious ehreat to
assured access to mining sites. The actual criteria for
the Co~mission to employ in reaching their decisions on
access applications has not been defined.
It is not clear that United States mining companies
with the capacity and qualifications to develop deep seabed
minerals would be granted mine sit~s. There is no solution
provided for in the Treaty for a qualified applicant whose
proposal simply is not acted upon by the Legal and
Technical Commission.
Even if the United States were to be provided with a
permanent or guaranteed seat on the Council, we would not
have influence ~hich would be equal to our economic and
political interests and our financial contributions. We
might be able to protect ourselves against some adverse
decisions, we would not have any sufficient voting strength
to influence important decisions.
And so it is evident that policy making would be carried
out by an organization based on the principle of sovereign
equality, one nation, one vote. The policies of the Author-
ity would be decided by a plenary Asserr~ly operating on a
two-thirds majority. As a consequence, a majority of
nations with political, philosophical, and economic goals
46
different from those of the United States, could abuse the
vague, discretionary provisions of th£ Treaty. They could
make decisions that could hinder United States access to
seabed minerals.
When one considers the Treaty provisions which limit
the annual seabed mineral production for a period of twenty
years, it is again apparent that this limitation will reduce
access and hinder development of the minerals. Restrictions
would be placed on the amount which any single project could
produce. The Authority has broad discretion to select among
competing applications when the limit on seabed production
has been reached. This discretio~ could be used to deny an
American company access to the seabed. Given the composi-
tion and voting scheme of the entire organization the over-
all policy orientation of the Authority could encourage
restrictions on seabed mineral production with limitations
on access to American mining companies.
Considering the review Conference provided for in the
Treaty, it essentially could impose treaty amendments on
the United States over our objection. The Treaty calls for
a conference to be convened after the first fifteen years·
of the Treaty regime, to determine whether the Treaty's
policies have been fulfiLled. The wording of the provision
indicates that the Conference could stress the extent to
which the Treaty provisions for seabed mineral mining
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provided protection for land-based producers of the same
minerals and promoted mining by the Enterprise and the
developing countries. If two-thirds of the states that are
parties to the Treaty decided to change the system of
mining, they could do so after five years of negotiation
~nd after ratification by two-thirds. This would happen
without any Senate action.
It is also not very realistic to believe that the
parallel system would survive this review when the Rnter~
prise and the developing states would have the choice to
establish a monopoly for the Enterprise which would be
totally unacceptable to the United States. This review
would allow changes in the basic rules early in the pro-
duction stage of recovery and the conditions essential for
economically viable mining would be altered and unaccept-
able.
The last of the Presidential concerns was the contro-
versial provisions of the Treaty that assured access to
technology that could guarantee the Enterprise and the
developing countries the capability to mine the deep sea-
bed. It is the mandatory nature of the transfer provision
requiring the sale of technology to developing countries
that causes great opposition from the Untied States. It
was Kissinger's proposal in 1976 that indicated that there
would be some type of necessary technology transfer to the
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Enterprise and developing states mining efforts. However,
the Treaty technology transfer provisions ~equire that
technology used in mining the deep seabed under the
Authority, which is legally transferable and available on
reasonable teIms and conditions, be made available b~ the
operators to the Enterprise and to developing countries
when requested. The mandatory provisions of the transfer
will only be invoked if the Enterprise is unable to acquire
the technology on the open market at reasonable terms.
'The companies who have developed this technology at
great risk and expense claim that this transfer will com-
promise their proprietary information. They also feel that
their bargaining position for sale of new technology of
some long-term value will be weakened by their obligation
to sell. They see that their huge c9pital investments into
ocean mining technology will not be reflected under the so
called fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions
provided for in the text of the Treaty.
James Malone, Special Representative of the President
of the U.S. made a statement before an informal meeting
convened by the President of the Conference and Chairman of
the First Committee on August 3, 1981. The copy in my
possession cautions that the statement is provided for the
use of Law of the Sea Conference participants only and is
not intended for public dissemination. I feel that since
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the events have unfolded, and the content of this statement
is common knowledge today, there is no moral obligation to
honor the caution against public dissemination. I will
therefore quote from Mr. Malone's statement.
In the attempt for the United States to put forwaxd the
issues resulting from the review of the Draft Convention,
Malone placed before t,he Committee a series of criteria
used to evaluate Part X.I of the draft treaty. They were
the same items that were mentioned in his statement before
the Committee on Foreign Affiars on April and cited earlier
in this chapter. The one major significant item in this
statement was, after he outlined the problems that the U.S.
has with the powers of the Assembly and the Council, he
states
. . . If we can establish a regime for seabed
minerals which meets the concerns we have out-
lined in connection with the powers of the
Assembly and the Council and the production
policies of the Authority, our view of7this COn-
vention could be dramatically altered.
Thus, the United States had laid down its objections to
Part XI of the Convention before those who could influence
the future course of United States participation.
T.G. Kronmiller, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Oceans and International Environmental and Science
Affairs, delivered a statement before the Marine Technology
Society on September 8, 1981, in which he outlines the
happenings leading up to Mr. Malone's statement. He recalls
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that on August the 5th, 1981, the President, Mr. Koh, con-
vened an informal meeting of the plenary at the request of
the Chairman of the Group of 77. The United States was
requested to deliver a comprehensive statement of its'
position. Rather, Mr. Malone concentrated on questions
raised during the review period as they were issues of
importance to the U.S. and involved Part XI of the informal
draft. 8
On August the 10th, the Chairman of the Group of 77
presented a statement to this same informal group at which
he outlined the disbelief, consternation and general con-
fusion that the 0.5. review caused the entire Convention.
He did mention the Group of 77 and the Conference as a whole
agreed to provide the U.S. with the time to complete the
review. With Malone's statement earlier, really not what
everyone had in mind, the Group of 77 launched a verbal
attack with all of the harsh innuendoes characteristic of
these exchanges over the years. He mentions the right of
the U.S. to its' opinions and the rest of the world to their
individual rights, and addresses the Common Heritage of
Mankind. He then said
. . The United States perhaps believes
~hat it would be in a position to mine the seabed
area without an international treaty through its
national legislation. 1'he views of the Group of
77 to the effect that such unilateral legislation
is contrary to international law are clear and on
the record and I do not have to repeat them. The
Area and its resources which are the Common
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Heritage of Mankind cannot be allowed to be
exploited by a few, for the benefit of a few, to
the exclusion of the rest of the world. • ..
Great powers cannot afford anymore the luxury of
pursuing national interests which adversely affect
the developing countries and still hope to be
accepted as world leaders. Po.lieies geared only
to the achievement of national goals and objec-
tives would be counter-productive and could lead
1:0 an ultim~te bgeakdown in international
relations ....
The statement continues in the vein of the quotation,
stressing how it was agreed in 1978 that any revisions of
the text should be a result of the negotiations themselves
and not as a result of any single person or delegation
introducing them, unless they had been presented to the
Plenary who would give widespread support if it was felt to
offer a substantially improved prospect of consensus. The
Group of 77 said that it was committed to this agreement
since the members felt that if all delegations were to
attempt to renegotiate the issues that they had doubts
about, then the negotiations would never end. liThe present
text may not be satisfactory in all its aspects to all dele-
gations but it can be stated fairly confidently that it
commands the best prospects of consensus. . The Group
of 77 is also of the view that there should not be any
reopening of issues already negotiated."lO
On August the 13th, Ambassador Malone delivered a
statement in which he outlined tbe specific areas to which
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the United States' objectives are not met, the items devel-
oped at the start of this chapter.
On August the 17th the Chairman of the Group of 77 again
addressed the informal group to an-swer Ambassador Malone's
comments of the 13t.h. The most significant part of this
statement is in the opening of the first substantiv,e para-
graph, Mr. Hague states . . "I should also underline that
my statement today should not be const~ued as the beginning
of a dialogue on the basis of the objectives set forth by
Ambassador Malone, since in our view these objectives are
neither widely shared nor compatible with the overriding
.c h' . l' . ..11concerns o~ t e ~nternat~ona communlty.
And so the lines were draw~ and the views of the parties
known. Whether or not the final negotiating session, which
ended in New York and the vote already discussed, achieved
the objectives of the Untied States depends upon one's per-
spective. When you see that the text that finally evolved
moved towards the United States' demands in a number of
ways, you sec some progress. The final draft amended the
provisions for voting in the Council to provide that the
largest consumer would be guaranteed a seat on the Council;
it in~roved the procedure to be followed in the consideration
of amendments after twenty years by providing that every
effort should be made to achieve consensus, and by increasing
the majority required to approve such amendments from two
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thirds to three fourths. Very probably the most sig~ificant
change was that the Conference approved a special resolution
that gave the four first-generation mining consortia special
status as pioneer investors, thereby virtuaLly assuring
them of a secure mine site when the superceding Treaty it-
self entered into force, or even if it did not. The issue
of national liberation front movements was sidestepped by
permitting them to continue in the same observer status to
which they had been entitled during the negotiations
themselves. 12
From another perspective we find that the texts did not
make the extensive fundamental changes in the system that
the U.S. delegation considered to be required. Financial
arrangements, the production ceiling and the governance
provisions were carried forward virtually unchanged. More
flexible instructions might have made it possible for the
U.S. to achieve two small but important changes that had
been suggested by a rather neutral group of Western coun-
tries that were friendly to the U.S. The proposals were
that of eliminating the mandatory aspect of technology
transfer; and changing the amendmen~ procedure so that an
amendment, even when ratified by the necessary majority of
other states, would not be binding on a state that had not
or would not ratify it.
During most of the session it seemed inevit-
able that these proposals, or variants thereof f
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would be included in the final text of the Conven-
tion. However, the inflexibility of both sides
and the procedure adopted made this impossible.
The G-77 adopted a negative attitude that failed
to appreciate the importance of the proposals of
the 11 'good samaritans' for overcoming at least
those of the U.S. objections that were most widely
shared by the other industrialized states. The
USA did not reject the proposals of the G-1l
alliance, but raised a series of difficulties
th~t w~re t~terpreted by many as a form of
reJectlon.
~he proposals offered to the United States' concerns over
Part 11 were insufficient and, as mentioned in the opening
Chapter of this discussion, the vote was demanded and the
results tallied which revealed the U.S. rejection of the
Treaty.
Before we can discuss the implications of the U.S.
living outside the Treaty, we must consider the aspect of
the freedom of navigation and overflight for both military
and commercial vessels and aircraft.
In Chapter II of this discussion the history of the
development of the concept of wFreedom of the Sea" was
evolved and traced up to 1945, then beyond, to the creation
of the Law of the Sea Conference which essentially will end
with 'the Treaty's ratification, whenever. We have demon-
strated the concern of some major maritime powers on the
encroachment of the freedom of the seas as concerns the
l2-mile territorial sea and transit of certain straits. We
detailed the procodures involved in the Conference sessions
where the United States, after concerted effort, managed to
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get the navigation rights, including straits passage in the
Treaty package by 1976 when Henry Kissinger was still
attempting to get the Conference moving on the deep seabed
issues.
Suffice it to say, at this point, that the United states
concerns of freedom of the seas and specifically transit
passage issues, were part of the Treaty. The President of
the United states has already been quoted in this discussion
as stating that the transit passage provisions are most
acceptable to the United states.
The question remains, now that we know that and why
the United states has rejected the Treaty, as to what will
be the problems of our existing outside of the UNCLOS III
Law of the Sea Treaty.
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CHAPTER V
U.S. Nonparticipation and Current Reality
Whether or not others join the United States in reject-
ing the Treaty, certain lines have been drawn up between a
few countries and the rest of the world. The United States
position is that its nationals have the right to mine the
deep seabed nodules in areas beyond the national jurisdic-
tion as a traditional right of the freedom of the high seas,
(supra, p. 36). The vast majority of other nations do not
recognize such a right. The U.S. position argues that the
balance of the Treaty, in which the U.S. was involved with
the negotiationa and to which we have no objections, will
become customary international law because they will be so
widely accepted. As customary law the u.s. would be able
to take advantage of them even though we refused to sign
the Treaty itself.
The late Professor Oppenheim, in his Treatise on Inter~
national Law, last published in 1957 r identifies two sources
of International Law. "The sources of International Law
are therefo~e twofold, namely: (1) express consent; which
is given when states conclude a traaty stipulating certain
rules fOr the future international conduct of the parties;
(2) tacit consent, that is, implied consent or conserit by
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conduct, which is given through states having adopted the
custom or submitting to certain rules of international
conduct. III
McDougal and Reisman, in their discussion of the
juridical nature of customary norms of international law,
state
. Customary norms of international law
are being formed in international practice, as a
rule, gradually. . Historically a customary
norm of international law appears as a result of
reiterated actions of states. The element of
repetition constituteS the point of departure of
its formation. In the majority of cases it is
precisely the repetition of certain actions in
analogous situations that leads to such practices
becoming a rule of conduct. It is conceivable,
however, for the element of repetition in some
cases not to occur for the rule of conduc~ to
appear as a result of one precedent only.
and as to the time aspects of this development
. Duration, or in other words, the cle-
ment of time, also plays an important role in the
process of formation of a customary norm of inter-
national law. •. The element of time does not
in itself create a presumption in favor of the
existence of a customary norm. Although in
fact time plays a bLg part in the process. .,
juridically the element of time can not in itself
have a decisive significance. Depending on cir~
curnstances, a customary norm may take time to
develop ~ut may also be formed in a short period
of time.
In relation to treaties as a source of obligation we see
from Henkin that
Considered in themselves, and particuLarly
in their inception, treaties, are, formally, a
source of obligation rather than a source of law .
. A statute is always, from its inception,
law: a treaty may reflect, or. lead to, law, but
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particularly in its inception, is not, as such
law. ~ .. In itself, the treaty and the law it
contains only applies to the parties to it. True,
where it reflects existing law, non-parties may
conform to the same rules, but they do so by
virtue of the rules of general law thus reflected
in the treaty, not by virtue of t~e treaty itself.
In that sense, the treaty may be an instrument in
which the law is conveniently stated, and evidence
of what it is, but it is still not lEself the
law--it is stil~ not a source of law but only
evidence of it.
Professor Jonathan Charney of Vanderbilt University, in
an address before the Duke University Law of the Sea Sympo~
sium in October 1982, addressed the problems of the u.s. if
we remain outside of the Treaty.S In discussing the rules
for the development of general international law he calls
attention to the International Court of Justice decisions
in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. This case is
detailed in McDougal and Reisman. 6 One of the major opinions
of this court came up in the context of the Law of the Sea.
The question was whether or not the equidistanoe rule of
the 1958 UNCLOS I, was a norm of international law applic-
able to states who are not a party to the Convention. The
Court discussed how questions of this kind are to be
evaluated.
. . . There are three ways which a rule found
in an international agreement might be relevant
to a search for general international law~ First,
the rule might be a codificatLon of a preexisting
norm of international law. In that circumstance
one must refer to international practice outside
of the agreement to determine whether or not the
norm exists outside of the agreement. Second,
the rule might serve the function of bringing
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into existence a norm that is in the formative
stages of development in international practice.
Thus, the articulation of the norm in the agree-
ment and the subscription to the norm by the
parties to the agreement may provide the final
elements needed to crystallize prior real world
circumstances in order to give birth to a new
norm of international law. Third, the government
might develop a new norm of international law
which once subscribed to by the state parties to
the agreement might initiate a series of actions
outside the agreement tha, would give rise to a
general legal obligation.
The purpose of these extensive quotations is to provide
the most vital and basic oconcepts of the international law,
as viewed by the layman, to demonstrate that those who pro-
fess that the new Law of the Sea Treaty, with all of its
provisions, will find its way into international law, have
a most difficult task of demonstrating this. It surely is
not impossible. However, part XI could never find its way
into international law but it could create and develop some
new norms outside of the economic aspects of deep seabed
mining.
The United States has been accused of picking parts of
the Treaty it likes and rejecting those not acceptable to
it. 'The real issue is whether a treaty, specifically the
Law of the Sea Treaty, once it acquires sufficient ratifica-
tions to enter into force among the ratifying states, auto-
matically achieves some level of status, some binding forGe
against all nations, including those states which have not
ratified it.
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Many Treaty supporters argue that the terms of the
Treaty will become effective for all nations when it enters
into force. The Group of 77 have been very vocal with this
reasoning, as evidenced in the preceding chapter. It is
true that many articles in the Treaty reflect existing gen-
eral norms of international law and consequently only codify
what has been the law for a period of time. There are other
articles which do not reflect existing customary law and
practice. They amount to an attempt to generate new law.
As we have seen, this new law is only binding on those
states which choose to accept and implement it, at least
until such time as the level of recognition and implementa-
tion of those provisions is so extensive that it reflects
evolving norms of general international practice as dis-
cussed at the beginning of this chapter.
In light of the principles 0f international law, the
thrusts of the current United States strategy on the Law of
the Sea, beyond our. denial that the 1982 Treaty b~Dds us in
any way, appear to be two-fold. The United States will
have to try to influence and direct the understanding and
future course of customary law of the sea, and will have to
enter into discussions and negotiations with appropriate
nations with a view toward achieving understanding or a,gree-
ment favorable to U.S. ocean interests.
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What then are the issues as they relate to the deep
seabed portions of the Treaty and transit passage through
straits used for international navigation, with the issue
in this case being whether these parts of the Treaty are
viewed as customary law. The position of the United States
about deep seabed min~ng as a right of the freedom of the
high seas was already discussed at the opening of this
chapter.
At issue, then, is the transit passage through straits
used for intern~tional navigation. It is C'laimed by many
that this is not customary law, but new law and therefore,
applies only to those nations who sign the Treaty. The
question is not the freedom of the high seas, but whether
customary international law recognizes the basic rights and
duties of transit passage as reflected in the Treaty, in-
cluding the right of submerged transit and overflight.
According to Rear Admiral Harlow, in an address at Duke
University Law Symposium on the Law of the Sea, October
1982, he said that it was ~he intent of the major maritime
powers on the point of transit on, over, and under the
waters in question, that each of their proposa~s of draft
language for straits relied on the phrase--'freedom of
navigation' as being inclusive of submerged transit,
II • it was the draft of the U.K. that was ultimately
adopted into the composite text. The U.K., in submitting
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this draft, made specific reference to the need 'to ensure
that unrestricted navigation through those vital links in
the world network of communications should remain available
for use by the international community. 1,,8
The Admiral also mentions that on several occasions
throughout the Conference's negotiating history countries
attempted to eliminate the right of sUbmerged transit from
the straits regime. It is obvious that if the attempt to
remove the right was at issue then the right existed. 9
The argument about the "normal mode" of transit is again
an old one but is a very valid concept. The normal mode
for a submarine is, in fact, submerged where she can
maneuver with great skill and ease since the hull design
was to give the ship maximum under water maneuverability.
Admiral Harlow states that there is no evidence in the
negotiating history that the word normal was in any way
b .. 10meant to e restrlctlve.
The leading military powers possessing nuclear powered
submarines have been transiting the international straits
sUbmerged for many years. The 12 mile territorial sea now
places the transit lanes inside a nations' territorial sea.
The former pattern of submerged operations, as a function
of that nations' strategic nuclear deterrence capabilities,
requires undetected operations. The earlier pattern of
sUbmerged operation was common knowledge and the affected
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nations, whose territorial seas were being used, had the
legal opportunity to chal~enge the concept in court. This
was not done and could, as a consequence, have es~ablished
an accep~ed international norm. In any event, the official
United States position on this matter is that, the absence
of any specific reference to submerged navigation in
straits, gives r.ise to the confirmation of ~he right .
. The term 'freedom of navigation' was care-
fully chosen by the original drafters of the
straits provisions, as it carries over, except as
explicitly restricted, the high seas connotati~~
of the phrase into the transit passage regime.
We must return to the question of the United States as
being outside of the Treaty, and yet being a third party
beneficiary of those non-seabed provisions acceptable to
us. McDougal and Reisman quote the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, in their discussions of The Conferment
of Benefits or Imposition of Obligations Upon Third States
in the Original Agreement. Article 36.CD of that discussion
.states
. • A right arises for a third state from
a provision of a treaty if the parties to the
treaty intend the provision to accord that right
either to the third state, or to a group of states
to which it belongs, or to all states, and the
·third state assents thereto. Its assent shall be
presumed so long as the 7ontrarY,is n?i indicated,
unless the treaty otherw~se prov~des.
The argument, then, states that because the Treaty did
not exclude any nations from its new law provisions, then
the third party rights are, in effect, legally valid.
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Additionally, the Treaty could not deny any nation its
rights under currently acceptable international law norms
nor can the Treaty cancel existing laws or norms.
This, then, leaves the United States outside of the
Treaty, by cfioice, but with all rights intact under inter-
national law norms, and the beneficiary effects of any
provisions of new law where exclusion has not actually been
provided in the text.
The questions remain as to whether the United States
would proceed under unilateral provisions of existing U.s.
law, and engage in deep seabed mining on the freedom of the
high seas concept, and how will the United States fare on
the Straits passage issues of the transit passage provisions
of the Treaty?
These questions will be answered in the conclusion to
follow in the next and final chapter of this discussion.
6§
CHAPTER VI
Conclusions
One of the areas of naval concern in the final version
of the Treaty was that of straits passage. The Treaty pro-
vides for the creation of a new international legal right:
transit passage. If not for the creation of the transit
passage right, passage through straits falling within
territorial waters would be governed by the provisions of
innocent passage which has been a recognized norm of
customary law for many years (supra, Chapter IT). The tran-
sit passage articles explicitly provide for the passage of
aircraft. No such passage is available for innocent passage.
There is no submarine prohibition under transit passage.
It is very probable that without the inflnence of the major
naval powers no provisions for transit passage would exist
in the final text of the Treaty. As we have mentioned,
strait states have opposed the adoption of any but innocent
passage rules. The important distinctions between innocent
passage and transit passage are those of most concern to
navies: submarine passage, overflight and military and
intelligence activities. Ships and aircraft transiting
these connecting points of the high seas may consider the
provisions of the Treaty as a current international expres=
sion of their rights and responsibilities. The balance
reflected in these provisions of the Treaty protect the
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legal interests of both the international community and the
coastal state. The practice that those provisions codify
ensures that the routes between the high seas will remain
free from unilateral obstruction while, at the same time,
provide a workable remedy against any fla.g state encroach~
ment of the residual rights of the strait state involved.
It is impossible to accept that the international community
would even consider administering two separate and distinct
sets of rules governing navigation righ~s, one set for
Treaty parties and a separate set for non-Treaty states.
It is to the best interests for the Treaty parties to
acknowledge the third party rights of nations and include
them in any law created by a unanimous acceptance of any
new international law norm. The legal right is there and
any attempt to deny it could lead to unnecessary legal
entanglements. I am sure that the United States will con-
duct itself in the proper legal manner and in accordance
with those issues already addressed in this discussion as
it relates to transit passage and freedom of the seas. The
United States, in conducting itself consistent with the
non-seabed provisions of the treaty, is actually contri-
buting to the shaping of customary law, so that choice pro-
visions of the treaty that do not reflect a general practico
accepted as law, will become such.
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In relation to deep seabed mining this same concept is
not valid since the opportunity does not exist. Activities
under the Treaty can affect the legal interests of the
United States only if they reflect customary law. As we
have seen, Part XI creates a new international organization.
The membership in this organization, as we have seen is by
contractual obligation. We know from our discussion that
customary international law must be formed outside of the
Treaty (supra, 58). We have also seen that the treaty can
not prevent independent development of customary law. As
the customary law develops for deep seabed mining, as a
function of the development of the mining, it is hoped that
due regard will be given to the interes~s of other states
who are operating under the exercise of the freedom of the
seas.
I do not believe that the United States will engage in
deep seabed mining on a unilateral basis. I do see the
U.S. Mining companies operating in accordance with the
Treaty but under a flag of convenience. If the United
States were so vitally interested in self sufficiency in
vital minerals found on the deep seabed, then the fight for
better Treaty provisions in this area could have evolved
over the years of negotiations.
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The United States will, however, conduct deep seabed
mining inside its' legal territorial limits coincidental
with the development of the technology.
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